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Abstract:  
In a social network, agents have their own reference group that may influence their 
behavior. In turn, the agents’ attributes and their behavior affect the formation and the 
structure of the social network. We survey the econometric literature on both aspects of 
social networks and discuss the identification and estimation issues they raise. 
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Introduction
Economists are becoming increasingly aware of the importance and ubiquity
of social networks. At a general level, a social network represents any pattern
of relationships between agents. Salient examples include friendship networks
among adolescents, coauthorship networks among scientists, and trade networks
between countries. In economics, a new body of theoretical work explores 1)
how social networks influence outcomes and 2) how in turn this aﬀects network
formation (Jackson 2008). At the empirical level, the literature is still scarce
but is expanding at a rapid pace. We focus here on the econometrics of social
networks. Following the theoretical work, we divide our presentation in two
parts. First, we discuss the issues raised by the analysis of the eﬀects of social
networks on outcomes. Second, we look at network formation. Throughout, we
assume that the network is binary1 and observed at one point in time.2 We also
leave aside the critical and understudied issue of sampling.
The Eﬀects of Social Networks on Outcomes
Researchers suspect that in many contexts, the behavior of individuals is
aﬀected by others. Economists have long tried to obtain reliable estimates of
such peer eﬀects, but the task is not easy. Recent papers have introduced social
networks to the analysis of peer eﬀects. They have looked at many outcomes.
Among others, we can mention welfare participation (Bertrand et al. 2000),
employment of war veterans (Laschever 2005), informal insurance against illness
(Dercon and De Weerdt 2006), educational choices (De Giorgi et al. 2007),
obesity (Trogdon et al. 2008), academic achievement (Lin 2008, Calvó-Armengol
et al. forthcoming), and recreational activities (Bramoullé et al., forthcoming).
Overall, these studies show that social networks oﬀer a fresh perspective on the
issue.
In general, the identification of peer eﬀects raises three main challenges
(Manski 1993). First, the researcher must determine the appropriate reference
groups. Who is aﬀected by whom? The collection of comprehensive information
on interactions provides a direct answer to this question. By definition in a so-
cial network, each agent has his own specific reference group. Indeed, the papers
mentioned above rely on original data sets possessing detailed information on
social structures, such as the Add Health data.
Second, unobserved attributes that are correlated between peers may gen-
erate a problem of confounding variables (spurious correlation). For instance,
individuals in the same reference group may face similar environments (e.g., a
student and her friends may have the same professor). Self-selection may also
induce the presence of such correlated eﬀects. Similar individuals tend to in-
teract together, which makes the formation of the network endogenous. This
endogeneity should be corrected for in the estimation of peer eﬀects.
1The network is binary if two agents are either connected or unconnected. Alternatively,
the links could diﬀer in strength, e.g., Marmaros and Sacerdote (2006).
2Repeated observations of the network through time opens up interesting econometric
possibilities, e.g., Fafchamps et al. (2008).
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Third, simultaneity in peer behavior may hinder identification of exogenous
eﬀects, i.e., the influence of peer attributes, from endogenous eﬀects, i.e., the
influence of peer outcomes. This is the reflection problem studied by Manski
(1993). Even in the absence of correlated eﬀects, distinguishing exogenous and
endogeneous eﬀects is impossible in the context of a linear-in-means model when
agents interact in groups, i.e., the social network is partitioned in groups and
individuals are aﬀected by all others in their group but by none outside of it.
Only a composite social eﬀect can be identified. Moreover, this latter eﬀect
cannot generally be identified in the presence of correlated eﬀects. In contrast
all eﬀects can be identified, under certain conditions, when the social network
has a richer structure.3
To see why, let us focus on a simple model inspired by Bramoullé et al.
(BDF, forthcoming). The reference group of agent i (i = 1, ..., n) in a network
is given by the set Pi with size ni. Assume a linear-in-means model where yi is
the outcome of agent i, xi is an attribute of i (the model can easily be generalized
to many attributes), β and δ are resp. the endogenous and the exogenous social
eﬀect, with |β| < 1, and i is a random term. Suppose first that the xi ’s are
strictly exogenous (no correlated eﬀects). The structural model can be written
as:
yi = α+ β
P
j∈Pi yj
ni
+ γxi + δ
P
j∈Pi xj
ni
+ i, E[i | x] =0,
or, in matrix notation,
y =αι+βGy+ γx+ δGx+ ², E[² | x] = 0, (1)
where y is a n×1 vector of outcomes for the network l, G is an n×n interaction
matrix with Gij = 1/ni if i is aﬀected by j, and 0 otherwise, and ι is a n× 1
vector of ones. This model can be derived from a choice-theoretic approach
where individuals choose their outcome to maximize a quadratic utility and so-
cial interactions have reached a Nash equilibrium. Note also that the systematic
part of (1) is similar to that of a spatial autoregressive (SAR) model (e.g., Cliﬀ
and Ord 1981) extended to allow for exogenous eﬀects.
BDF show that θ = (α, β, γ, δ) is identified given the moment restriction
E[² | x] = 0 and restrictions on G. More specifically, they show that the model
is identified if and only if the matrices I,G, and G2 are linearly independent.
Two particular cases illustrate this basic result. First, suppose that agents
interact in groups. In this case, Pi is composed of all individuals in i’s group.
Then, G is block-diagonal with G2 = G. Therefore, social eﬀects are not
identified. This corresponds to the Manski’s (1993) case. Second, assume the
presence of intransitivity in the network, e.g., in a friendship network, some
3Other approaches can help identification. For instance, Brock and Durlauf (2001) exploit
the non-linearities emerging from discrete choice models, Gaviria and Raphael (2001) and
Trogdon et al. (2008 ) impose exclusion restrictions by assuming no exogenous or no endoge-
nous eﬀects, and Sacerdote (2001) exploit data where individuals are randomly assigned to
groups.
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friends of i’s friends are not her friends. Their attributes will aﬀect her outcome
only through their eﬀect on her friends’ outcomes. In this case, the model
is identified and can be estimated using 2SLS (Lin 2008).4 Indeed, from an
expansion series of Gy in the reduced form, it is clear that (G2x,G3x,...) can
be used as valid instruments. These instruments have a direct interpretation.
For instance, G2x represents the vector of the friends’ friends mean attributes
of each agent in the network. Intransitivity guarantees that this vector is not
perfectly correlated with the exogenous regressors.5
This baseline model can be extended to the presence of correlated eﬀects.
Assume that the latter can be treated as component fixed eﬀects. A component
is a maximum set of indirectly related agents. Fixed eﬀects can be interpreted
as a two-step network formation: the agents of the same type join a club (the
component) and then links between these agents are made at random. A number
of papers treat correlated eﬀects using fixed eﬀects (e.g., Clark and Loheac 2007,
Lin 2008, Lee et al. 2008). In analogy with a panel model, one can get rid of
the fixed eﬀects through transformations in deviation from the agent’ neighbors
(local transformation) or from the agent’ component (global transformation).
Thus, under the local transformation, the model can be written as:
(I−G)y = β(I−G)Gy + γ(I−G)x+ δ(I−G)Gx+ (I−G)²,
and is identified if and only if the matrices I,G, G2, and G3 are linearly inde-
pendent. As expected, this condition is more restrictive than in the absence of
correlated eﬀects. Identification now fails on some intransitive networks such as
the star.
If correlated eﬀects vary within components, however, a more elaborate study
of network formation may be needed. Thus, we turn to the econometrics of
network formation.
The Formation of Social Networks
Economists have only recently started to study network formation empiri-
cally. We discuss here the main features and limitations of the current economet-
ric methods. Most existing studies rely on some form of pairwise regressions, see
De Weerdt (2004), Fafchamps and Gubert (2007), Mayer and Puller (2008), Mi-
haly (2007), Santos and Barrett (2008), Udry and Conley (2004). The key idea
is to consider the links themselves as the outcomes to be explained. Researchers
then usually adapt standard empirical procedures for binary dependent vari-
ables.
Formally, a typical pairwise regression relies on the following econometric
4The model can also be estimated using conditional maximum likelihood if one is ready to
impose more structure on the distribution of , see Lee et al. 2008.
5 Surprisingly, intransitivity is not necessary to obtain identification. Social eﬀects may be
identified under group interactions if certain assumptions are satisfied, see Lee (2007) and
BDF.
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model:
Yij = X
0
ijζ + εij (2)
gij = 1 if Yij ≥ 0 and 0 if Yij < 0
where Yij is the propensity to form link ij, Xij is a vector of characteristics
of link gij and εij is a link-specific error term. This model can be applied
to directed as well as undirected networks. When the network is undirected,
gij = gji, and characteristics and propensities are defined for unordered pairs.
What are the choice-theoretic foundations of this model? The theory of
network formation gives us some guidance here, see Jackson (2008). In general,
individual i may derive some utility ui(g) from network g and this utility may
depend on the network’s structure in complex ways. Theorists have identified
two natural assumptions to study network formation. Under mutual consent, a
link is formed if both individuals agree to it. Alternatively, links may be formed
unilaterally.
To tie back pairwise regressions to individual decisions, strong assumptions
are needed. First and foremost, Model (2) relies on the separability of the
utility function. The utility derived from the network is equal to the sum of the
utilities brought by each link and these link-specific utilities are not aﬀected by
the structure of the network. Formally, ui(g) =
P
j vi(gij) and Yij = vi(gij =
1)− vi(gij = 0). But separability is not enough. When the network is directed,
model (2) is only consistent with separability and unilateral link formation.
When the network is undirected, an additional assumption of symmetry must
be imposed: vi(gij = 1) − vi(gij = 0) = vj(gij = 1) − vj(gij = 0). Model (2)
is then only consistent with separability and symmetry (under unilateral link
formation or mutual consent).
Even under these stark assumptions, estimating model (2) requires first to
answer three non-trivial questions.
1. Who are the potential partners? The default assumption is that every
other individual in the population is a potential partner. In this case, any pair
of individuals, connected or not, constitutes an observation. The number of
observations is n(n − 1) for directed networks and n(n − 1)/2 for undirected
ones. In large populations, however, most pairs tend to be unconnected. The
outcome to be explained has little variation and the interpretation of the method
is problematic. It means that an individual considers whether to form a link
or not with every other individual. Time and social constraints suggest, rather,
that the set of potential partners is usually much smaller than the population
at large. In some cases, individuals are naturally partitioned into particular sets
(schools, villages) and assuming that individuals can only connect within these
sets mitigates these concerns. But more research is likely needed to provide a
good answer to this problem.6
6Mihaly (2007) assumes that the set of potential partners is unobserved and builds a
simulated likelihood by picking at random many sets of potential partners. Another promising
idea is to distinguish between meetings and links formed conditional on meetings, see Jackson
& Rogers (2007) and Mayer & Puller (2008).
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2. How to include individual characteristics? Link characteristics Xij are
often built from individual characteristics Xi and Xj . Researchers have used
various ways to do that. We think that pairwise regressions for directed net-
works should generally include Xi,Xj , and |Xi − Xj |.7 Including Xi and Xj
separately is necessary to account for the potential eﬀect of the characteristic
on the propensity to initiate or receive a link. Including |Xi − Xj | is natural
given the prevalence of homophily in social networks.8
3. What structure to impose on the error term? Unobserved attributes of
an individual likely aﬀects all his linking decisions. Thus, we generally expect
εij to be correlated with εik and this should be accounted for when computing
standard errors. Introducing individual fixed eﬀects provides one way to ad-
dress this issue, see Udry and Conley (2004). Another way is to generalize the
standard computations for robust covariance matrices. Fafchamps and Grubert
(2007) build on Conley (1999) to derive appropriate formulas.
Once these three questions have been answered, the likelihood of network
g can be computed and model (2) can be estimated through maximum likeli-
hood. Logit procedures can be used. Pairwise regressions, however, have severe
limitations. First as mentioned above, even under separability, model (2) is
inconsistent with natural models of network formation such as mutual consent
for directed networks. Comola and Fafchamps (2008) tackle this issue. They
show that the appropriate likelihood can easily be computed and maximized as
long as separability holds.
More importantly, separability is a strong assumption which is unlikely to
hold in many settings. Especially, model (2) may fail to explain key structural
properties of the network, such as low diameter, high clustering, and fat tails
in degree distributions (Jackson 2008). At this stage, a main challenge for
applied economists is to develop models which go beyond separability, explain
these structural properties, and have sound microeconomic foundations. To do
that, they should build on insights from game theorists, sociologists (Snijders
et al. 2006), and physicists (Newman et al. 2006). Many interesting models
of network formation have been proposed. The diﬃculty is now to implement
these models empirically.9
Finally, a proper analysis of network formation shoud help to correct for
the endogeneity of the network in the estimation of peer eﬀects. Especially,
economists should be able to develop two-step selection models à la Heckman in
a network context.10 Much research remains to be done on each step separately
and on their combined estimation.
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see Weinberg (2006), Mihaly (2007) and Conti et al. (2009).
6
Bertrand, M., Luttmer E.F.P. and Mullainathan S. (2000): “Network Eﬀects
and Welfare Cultures”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 115, 1019-1056
Bramoullé, Y., Djebbari H. and Fortin B. (forthcoming): “Identification of peer
eﬀects through social networks”, Journal of Econometrics.
Bramoullé, Y. and Rogers B. (2009): “Diversity and Popularity in Social Net-
works,” mimeo.
Brock, W. and Durlauf, S. (2001): “Interaction-based Models”, Handbook of
Econometrics, vol 5, J. Heckman and Leamer E. (Eds), Amstersam: North-
Holland.
Calvó-Armengol, A., Patacchini, E., and Zenou, Y. (forthcoming): “Peer Eﬀects
and Social Networks in Education”, Review of Economics Studies.
Clark, A. and Loheac, Y. (2007): ”It wasn’t me, It was them! Social Influence
in Risky Behaviour by Adolescents”, Journal of Health Economics, Vol.26, no.4,
pp.763-784.
Cliﬀ, A. and Ord J. K. (1981): Spatial Processes. London: Pion.
Comola, M. and Fafchamps M.. (2008): “Testing Unilateral versus Bilateral
Link Formation,” mimeo.
Conley, T. (1999): “GMM estimation with cross-sectional dependence,” Journal
of Econometrics, 92, 1-45.
Conti, G., Galeotti, A., Mueller, G., and Pudney S.. (2009): “Popularity,”
mimeo.
Dercon, S. and De Weerdt, J. (2006): “Risk-Sharing Networks and Insurance
against Illness”, Journal of Development Economics, 81(2), 337-356.
De Giorgi, G., Pellizzari, M., and Redaelli S. (2007). ” Be Careful of the Books
you Read as of the Company You Keep: Evidence on Peer Eﬀects in Educational
Choices” (2833), IZA DP No. 2833.
De Weerdt, J. (2004): “Risk-Sharing and Endogenous Network Formation,”
ch.10 in Insurance Against Poverty, S. Dercon (ed.), Oxford University Press.
Fafchamps, M. and Gubert F. (2007): “Risk Sharing Networks in Rural Philip-
pines,” Journal of Development Economics, 71, 261-287.
Fafchamps, M., Goyal, S. and van der Leij M. (2008): “Matching and Network
Eﬀects,” mimeo.
Gaviria, A. and Raphael, S. (2001): “School based Peer Eﬀects and Juvenile
Behavior”, Review of Economics and Statistics, 83(2), 257-268.
Jackson, M. (2008): Social and Economic Networks, Princeton University Press.
Jackson, M. and Rogers B. (2007): “Meeting Strangers and Friends of Friends:
How Random are Social Networks?” American Economic Review, 97(3), 890-
915.
Krishnan, P. and Scubbia E. (2007): “Links and Architecture in Village Net-
works,” Economic Journal, forthcoming.
Laschever, R. (2005): “The Doughboys Network: Social Interactions and Labor
Market Outcomes of World War I Veterans”, Mimeo, Northwestern University.
Lee, L.F., Liu, X., and Lin, X. (2008): ”Specification and Estimation of Social
Interaction Models with Network Structure, Contextual Factors, Correlation,
and Fixed Eﬀects”, Mimeo, Department of Economics, Ohio State University.
7
Lee, L. F. (2007): “Identification and Estimation of Econometric Models with
Group Interactions, Contextual Factors and Fixed Eﬀects”, Journal of Econo-
metrics, 140(2), 333-374.
Lin, X. (2008): “Identifying Peer Eﬀects in Student Academic Achievement by
Spatial Autoregressive Models with Group Unobservables”, Mimeo, Department
of Economics, Tsinghyua University, Beijing.
Marmaros, D. and Sacerdote B. (2006): “How do friendships form?” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 121(1), 79-119.
Manski, C. (1993): “Identification of Endogenous Social Eﬀects: The Reflection
Problem”, Review of Economic Studies, 60(3), 531-542.
Mayer, A. and Puller S. (2008): “The old boy (and girl) network: Social network
formation on university campuses,” Journal of Public Economics, 92, 329-347.
Mihaly, K. (2007): “Too Popular for School? Friendship Formation and Acad-
emic Achievement,” mimeo.
Newman, M., Barabási, A.L., and Watts D. (2006): The Structure and Dynam-
ics of Networks, Princeton University Press.
Sacerdote, B. (2001): “Peer Eﬀects with Random Assignment: Results for Dar-
mouth Roommates”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(2), 681-704.
Santos, P. and Barrett C.. (2008): “Identity, Interest and Information Search in
a Dynamic Rural Economy,” mimeo.
Snijders, T., Pattison, P., Robins, G., and Handcock M. (2006): “New specifica-
tions for exponential random graph models,” Sociological Methodology, 99-153.
Trogdon J., Nonnemaker J. and Pais J. (2008): “Peer Eﬀects in Adolescent
Overweight”, Journal of Health Economics, 27(5), 1388-1399
Udry, C. and Conley T. (2004): “Social Networks in Ghana,” mimeo.
Weinberg, B. (2006): "Social Interactions and Endogenous Association," mimeo.
8
